Earlier German DoW on US

In June 1941 US President Roosevelt decided to order the US military to occupy Iceland, replacing British soldiers there. Task Force 19 carrying the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrived 7 July & was offloaded by 12 July. On 6 August, the U.S. Navy established an air base at Reykjavík with the arrival of Patrol Squadron VP-73 PBY and VP-74.

The PoD here is Hitler reacts badly to the news of US forces moving to Iceland & a series of bungled orders from him lead to a German submarine attacking a US flagged ship, wich quickly escalates into US counter attacks, including German aircraft reconoitering the Iceland area. In a fit of rage Hitler declares war on the US in August 1941.

How does this change the remainder of 1941 & beyond?

My first thought is US military officers become present amougn British & Soviet forces earlier, observing more of the details of fighting the Germans sooner. Second the establsihment of token US forces in the UK comes earlier, and work on the Persian lend-lease route is accelerated, as is aid to the USSR. More important is secret negotiations with the French start earlier and Operation Gymnast is more likely to be executed in mid 1942, vs Op Torch in Nov 1942.

 

Let me be the first to point out that your scenario occured in Oct 41' with the sinking of the USS Reuben James (DD 245), although the incident did not lead to a DoW by either side.

As for effect, US observers might have spurred some different design thoughts on US army equipment, say a Sherman Firefly equivelent, or perhaps more tank destroyers. The navy would start earlier on ASW efforts. I do not see much different in the Air Corps.

There may be a increase in lend lease, but it should be remembered that at this time the west had generally poor equipment to offer the USSR. And the USSR was losing said equipment at an alarming rate in this period.

I am not sure how much sooner US forces could have engaged German-Italian forces in North Africa. US troops were very green in the fall of 1942 as it is. I could see troops being sent to join the 8th Army to gain experience. Then there is the availability of landing craft.

The biggest hurtle is the scenario itself. A German DoW after a naval incident would not have the emotional impact that the "sucker punch" that was Pearl Harbor. The US would go to war still divided by a strong isolationist movement. Remember heavy volunteer enlistments followed Dec. 7th. But in this case I suspect most men would be content to wait until they were called up.

This attitude would be reflected in the work place as well, as civilian efforts would be less focused as was historicly was the case. Political will would also be affected as there would be less "national unity" among the congress. There would also be less tolerence for any early setbacks.

What could be ineresting to consider is the Japanese reaction to this.

 

The variable is in the scale of the confrontation, several attacks around Iceland, and Hitlers reaction.

I'm unsure if four months would make much difference for R&D. Perhaps if the US Army ordnance team gets to the Lybian battlefield six moths earlier something like the T20 tank design emerges six months earlier? Or perhaps not. The Manhattten Project might be organized earlier, but four or five months earlier production of atomic bombs is the best case scenario, & that is not guaranteed. Research in 1941 was progressing about as fast as it could then anyway.

The important LL from the US in that time were industrial items the USSR urgently needed. Weapons from the US came much later. Have to look at th numbers & see if there was anything that could have been sent in larger quantity.

More USAAF personnel in the UK and Africa. While the US took eleven months from 7 Dec to 6 Nov to get ground forces into the fight in Africa, air force personnel liasion/training with the RAF and USAAF combat units were active in seven months in the UK and Egypt. The emergency nature of events in the Pacific from Dec 1941 delayed or diverted many of the trained USAAF air groups from action in Europe & Africa. Unless the Japanese enter the war months before they are prepared this diversion wont occur until 3-4 months after the German DoW.

If the Pacific emergency is not as bad then maybe operation Gynast will be executed in the spring or summer of 1942, vs Torch in November. US 'divsions' will remain green until they actually get into combat.

Probablly not a large a wave of angry volunteers, but it allows planning and actions to build up the military to accelerate. The Navy & War Departments are no longer trying to mobilize with peacetime attitudes and laws.

As for the Isolationists, they had already lost the support of most leftists when Germany attacked the USSR. MacNider the head of the America First organization was begaining to lose interest that summer. He resigned as head in November 1941 & shortly after returned to active service with a brigadier generals commission (later commanded a division in the South Pacific). As in December a German DoW & active warfare against the US pretty well undercuts the isolationist position.

Japan would make a last attempt to end the Allied embargos, and accelerate preperations for attacking the US, Commonwealth, Dutch miltary. They might hope the US will soften its position if suddenly embroled in war with Germany. Hard to say if they would forgo waiting for preperations for the Pearl Harbor attack to be completed & jump in months earlier.

The US military reaction will be a tightening of discipline and acceleration of preperation in the Pacific over the next few months. Material wise there may not be anything decisive that can be done, but another shipload of ammunition and a few more aircraft in the Phillipines is better than nothing. If a wartime metality does develop amoung the Pacific units before the Japanese attack that may make a difference.

 

Japan is rather caught between a rock and a hard place in this one. If they declare war right away then a PH attack is out. Indeed with the US already at war the chance of a PH attack suceeding is much lower and there may be fewer assets their in anycase. On the otherhand the big ships that came on line in 43 are for the most part underconstruction and more on order.

 

A better question, what does the US do about Japan. FDR wanted a greater role in combatting Hitler in europe and a German DoW would certainly bring this about. With the US committed to a european war would the US be more accomodating to Japan in an effort to forestall a general world war? If Japan could get an easing of the embargo would Japan be content to stay out of war with the US?

 

I'm not convinced they'd change much. When you look at the general attitude vs the Japanese in the US at the time I'm not sure they were very concerned about what the Japanese would do. Then consider that with the US in the war a good portion of that oil may be needed for the US and allies as well as other strategic materials.