Omaha beach German fire power

I was reading about the Omaha beach landings and how much artillery the Germans had in the area, I also read that the reasons much of this artillery was rendered useless later in the day battle was because they had run out of ammo, and stocks could not be brought forward because of the Allied air support. This is what I have on file about what Artillery the Germans had around the area.


716 Infantry Division
The 1716 Artillery Regiment.
1st Battalion,
1st Battery = 4 x 100mm Vz.14/19 Czech Howitzers
2nd Battery = 4 x 75mm FK nA
3rd Battery = 4 x 75mm FK nA
2nd Battalion,
4th Battery = 4 x 100mm Vz.14/19 Czech Howitzers
5th Battery = 4 x 100mm Vz.14/19 Czech Howitzers
6th Battery = 4 x 100mm Vz.14/19 Czech Howitzers
3rd Battalion,
7th Battery = 4 x 100mm Vz.14/19 Czech Howitzers
8th Battery = 4 x 105mm mle 13 French Guns
9th Battery = 3 x 150mm sFH (S.P. Artillery probably French AFVs modified)


The 352nd Infantry DivisionThe 352nd Artillery Regiment
1st Battalion,
1st Battery = 4 x 105mm leFH 16
2nd Battery = 4 x 105mm leFH 16
3rd Battery = 4 x 105mm leFH 16
2nd Battalion,
4th Battery = 4 x 105mm leFH 16
5th Battery = 4 x 105mm leFH 16
6th Battery = 4 x 105mm leFH 16
3rd Battalion,
7th Battery = 4 x 105mm leFH 16
8th Battery = 4 x 105mm leFH 16
9th Battery = 3 x 105mm leFH 16
4th Battalion,
10th Battery = 4 x 150mm leFH 18
11th Battery = 4 x 150mm leFH 18
12th Battery = 3 x 150mm leFH 18

Maisy Battery
6 x 155mm French mle 1917 Howitzers

Longues Battery
4 x 152mm M.1928 Naval Guns


The 352nd also had two Infantry Regiments, so it must have had its Infantry Guns and Medium and Heavy Mortars. The 716th was equipped with 75 Medium Mortars, so add that to the total above (not counting Anti-Tank Guns) and that was a lot of fire power.

 

On a slightly related issue, I was reading "Five Years, Four Fronts", which is by Georg Grossjohan. He was the infantry Commander in Normandy and its very interesting to see things from his point of view.
When you read his account, its really comes down to the Allies pummeling his forces with arty, and being totally paralyzed during the day.
We have this idea that somehow the Allies got the rough end of the deal, but the reality is that the Germans who fought were vastly outnumbered, and were slaughtered in most cases. They only had a single unit of Stugs for some time, and the operations which myth says were brutal for Allied tankers lead to total annihilation of the German armored units involved.
For instance, operation Goodwood and the related operations led to the total destruction of the German armored units involved, while History makes it seem like the Allies were the ones who had it hard.
When it comes down to it, the Allied arty vastly overpowered the Germans. This idea that the Germans slaughtered the Allies with arty and tanks is very one sided.

 

Yes you are right about the Germans being overpowered by Allied firepower, Reports say of Naval gun fire was so accurate that in they had a spotter to guide them they could and did destroy any German force that it was allocated. Add to the fact Allied air power and the amount of ammo available to Artillery on the ground and you could unleash a storm of HE any where on the German lines.

 

Before I was a member, this question intrigued me so I gathered information from around the web to see for myself. Every spring I seem to renew my interest in the Normandie battle. And like engineers with graphs, military analysis seems to require a sketch (attached)

First there were the Coast Batteries (4 guns each) at Point-du-Hoc and Longues. I believe these were to engage the smaller warships (destroyers) and the troop transports. Not sure if they would waste projectiles on armored cruisers and battleships. For those they had to rely on the thickness of their concrete casemates.

Then there were the fixed rockets (38 pits of four 320mm rockets per pit) placed in the center behind the beach area. Often identified as Nebelwerfer but these were fixed and not the mobil towed projectors. I imagine these arranged in a arc and adjusted to give complete coverage of the sea just off low tide. Given their inherent inaccuracy they cannot be aimed too close to friendly troops.

Third there is the Field Artillery Battalions (12 guns each). There were two from the 352.Infanterie Division in range of Omaha Beach. I imagine these were registered to fire between low and high tide among the beach obstacles. The Ia. of the 352.ID wrote that they only had one day unit-of-fire on hand.

Then there were the direct fire guns along the beach (75 and 88mm). These were positioned in bunkers to fire diagonally across the beach so not to expose themselves to naval gun fire.

Finally you have the infantry weapons of mortars, machine guns and small caliber AT guns (50 - 37mm). These were from the troops of the 716.Infanterie Division. Machine guns near the beach were able to fire grazing-fire along the beach while machine guns positioned on the bluff were able to fire plunging-fire into landing craft and over the beach shingle where the GI's tried to re-organize after their jumbled landing. I think this was the key difference at Omaha.

Then there were the foot mobile troops of the 352.ID (one battalion) who had their Infantry Guns (six 75mm and two 105mm). There was also a company of Marder's (about twelve 75mm self-propelled guns) that were sent to the Omaha Beach area but did not seem to make much impact.


These were the principle weapons targeted at Omaha Beach. There could be discussions as to whether adjacent batteries could fire on Omaha or if there were a mobile battery present. I did read in the account of the 716.ID that they had plans for batteries to fire harassing fire in adjacent sectors. I imagine this would be un-observed fire with additional safety measures imposed and only if their principle area was not being attacked.


Two excellent sites I found recently and have not yet fully explored are:

http://www.dday-overlord.com/eng/352...ivision_ob.htm

Omaha Beach-Vierville

Enjoy

 

About the German cost batteries in general:

Almost all could not(!) engage ships at sea because they lacked adequate fire control. What they were meant to do was shell the beaches.

 

I would not doubt they lacked adequate fire control to engage a maneuvering warship but what about stationary transports?

I've seen photos of the Longues casements and guns but I have not been able to discern the field of fire. I suppose it is possible they point either east or west, or, split half point east and half point west. Something to look into.

 

They probably lacked the optical equipment to see targets and/or adjust fire. Naval guns also outranged howitzers. The 5-in. guns on the Mahan Class had an maximum range of 16 km, whereas the 150-mm howitzers' maximum range was 14 km.

 

Not to derail this thread but to derail it, I often wondered why Goodwood had such a bad reputation as an Allied failure. Maybe it was because of Monty's charming personality. I think Monty's offensives against Rommel in Normandy is comparable to Grant versus Lee in Virginia; both were costly attrition battles lambasted by historians in the post-war generation but really were victories.

 

Unlike many Normandie batteries, there is no doubt about the equipment at Longues since they are still in place. As stated above: 4 x 152mm M.1928 Naval Guns (assuming that is a sensible description, not my expertise)

They apparently lacked the ability to target as a battery but did manage to fire individually at a number of ships. They do not appear to have been capable of firing on the beaches.


On the German rocket battalion, once again I have managed to embarrass myself with idle speculation. But admittedly I did not expect to find any details about their deployment.

In any case to improve the record here, the rockets were arranged in four groups and appear to be pointed at two target areas. The target areas appear to be the water just offshore in front of two -- of the three -- major draws.

Further Internet research(?) showed there were liquid incendiary munitions for these type rockets. Not sure if that was their only type ammunition. Not sure how they would work over water.

 

That is indeed interesting. Did your sources say those guns were technically unable to fire at warships, or just that they were not a match for Allied warships in practice?

 

Description of the Longues position

Longues sur Mer

Short description of the action

Longues-sur-Mer in Normandy 1944

I was too lazy to re-find these when I posted last. I'm sure there is more out there.

 

I confused your comment with Becker's. It is interesting that the batteries did fire on landing ships but failed to inflict significant damage. Any after action reports on the part of the surviving Germans with regard to the effectiveness in allied naval gunfire in disrupting their operations? It could not have been easy trying to fire your piece while being engaged by CB fire.

 

It should be noted that the OMAHA pre-invasion bombardment (both sea and air) was supposed to take out much of the German artillery, but for various reasons, such as moving the bomb line to the rear, much of the German arty escaped. Therefore, the Germans had more than they perhaps should of.

 

The pre-invasion bombardments could target the fixed batteries but I'm not so sure about the field batteries, six in the case of OMAHA. I can imagine the Germans moving these batteries around a bit to keep their specific location in doubt. I have never seen a description of what they might have done.

Also the British success on their right can be credited for keeping another three field batteries from firing on OMAHA.

 

Hi guys

An interesting discussion and I hope you don't mind if I add a little to it.

Your list of gun batteries under the control of the 1716th Artillery. Maisy (I) Battery 9 of the 1716th Artillery - Les Perruques had 6 x 166mm French howitzers as you correctly state. It was also in control of a Russian 7.65mm howitzer.

Maisy (II) La Martiniere had three casemented 105mm (Czech 100mm bored out cannons) in casements and another 4th one in the nearby field.

The battery at the rear of Maisy - which could well have been battery 10 of the 1716th Art. was at Foucher's Farm. It is assumed (from evidence dug up) that these guns were 4 x 150mm German cannons - destroyed on the 7th of June by USS Shoebrick.

The reason I bring up the calibre's and the position of these guns at Maisy is to answer the question of what positions could fire on the beaches. Maisy I - Les Perruques could hit Vierville - the Rangers exit on Omaha Beach.

Maisy II could easily (and did) hit the beach are at Pouperville (Utah beach) and was also recorded by the Germans and the Americans as firing at the landing craft and later the main shipping arriving in the area.

The guns at Fouchers Farm (Maisy) could hit well up Omaha Beach and by default easily the approaches and along Utah Beach.

The Ranges of the guns are well documented and shown in the US Navy Intelligence Report written for Admiral Hall by US Naval Intelligence in July 1944. There is a copy of the Range map on www.maisybattery.com and elsewhere on the internet.

It also shows quite clearly the relationship of the interconnecting fields of fire between the operational gun batteries on D-day. Pointe du Hoc is not shown as being operational on D-day - for the obvious reason that it was empty.

In reality there were very few fixed emplacements which could fire consistently accurately onto the beaches. The larger gun batteries:- covering Omaha approaches at the eastern end was Longues sur Mer.

The centre of Omaha beach is covered by Fouchers Farm (Maisy III).

The Western end of Omaha is covered by Les Perruques (Maisy II).

The southern end of Utah by La Martiniere (Maisy II) and Crisbecq covering the rest of the beach.

The three main coastal batteries covering those two areas are Crisbecq, Maisy and Longues sur Mer.

...

Regarding the use of 88mm guns. All the reports given by men on the ground, always state that they were being fired at by 88mm guns. And it became the standard GI call… "all we could hear were 88's"... But in reality - most (if not all) the emplaced guns on Omaha and Utah beaches were 75mm or lower. (excluding rockets obviously).

A classic example being the Pak 40 emplacement at Vierville - which is often (wrongly) described as being an 88mm weapon. To my knowledge there were no 88mm guns with direct fire on the beaches (but I will stand corrected if there were).

The reason for gun emplacements being fixed to the ground - rather than in field emplacements was simply one of accuracy. Once you had worked out the range, the grid reference of your target and plotted it onto your map - then you could easily fire round after round onto the same target area. This was helped by the fact that the Germans had calculated every beach exit, cross-roads, junction etc. for 4 years and marked them into books. Once the US soldiers arrived at a crossroads - for example marked Target 29 in the book - the gunners would already know what charge to use, what elevation to set too and what range etc. All they did was adjust the gun and fire.

When you think about it - it is ok discussing ranges of guns etc. But the naval forces had to come within the range of the German guns or they could not land - or offload their men. So range is not so much of an issue… but I think that a moving navy ship is a harder thing to hit than a stationery one.

Hence the Germans could follow (and fire upon) the landed troops with only a phone call from an observer watching their advance over land. Churches and tall buildings being the most obvious places.

In the cases of Crisbecq, Maisy and Longues sur Mer - all of these fixed coastal batteries are built on the highest ground in their area. They all have their own observation platforms.

Crisbecq's is next to the battery in the bunker (now at the side of the road).

Maisy has its observation at ground level at the beach in front of it.

Longues has its' in the big bunker near the cliff edge.

But all of them could have sent a man to stand outside within metres of their guns and they would have watch the invasion with binoculars. Each position does have that capability. I have stood at all three batteries many times and with binoculars you could see the whole of the invasion developing in that sector…. below you.

The comment that the Germans had little ammunition is simply wrong. I am sure some batteries were short of ammunition - but US Navy reports and separate US Signal Corps documents stated that Maisy Les Perruques had casements containing over 180 tonnes of 155mm shells waiting to be fired.

So no shortage of ammunition there. There were also live rounds found (and handed to the authorities) when the site was being cleared. These were found fused and ready to fire - next to one of the gun positions.

Maisy II La Martiniere was still firing at the US Army Rangers who attacked it from the rear on the 9th of June. US Naval Intelligence reports queried why the Germans had turned their guns around 180 degrees… it was to defend themselves from the Rangers coming over the fields behind them. As one Ranger (Jack Burke) told me… "they were still firing at us as we approached"… and this is borne out by contemporary photos of the guns which had been removed to the rear of the casements and the battle damage to the casements is all on their backs (away from the sea).

The point I am making is that there are a lot of "reports" and considered opinions which differ from the reality of the situation… 88's firing at the beaches, no ammunition on the day etc. Simply not accurate.

If I may pick up on another point mention above… "such as moving the bomb line to the rear, much of the German arty escaped" … this is so regularly repeated as to have become fact. All books make the same mistake by stating that the RAF and USAF dropped their bombs inland so they didnt hit their troops as they landed.

This is not the case - if you read the RAF reports from the day. I see regularly see that writers say the men were expecting bomb craters on the beach in which to hide…. yet in reality all the first wave troops were continually instructed to keep moving and get off the beaches as fast as possible… so which version is right?

​Are we to believe that the RAF were to bomb the beaches to give our men places to hide… of course not - they were told to fight and move inland.

The full explanation of this is described in "Cover Up at Omaha Beach" - which is available everywhere online etc. And I apologise for the plug for the book, but it really does explain all of the things that other books have, over the years simply repeated (wrongly). Pointe du Hoc being operational days before D-day etc. etc.

Indeed here is a direct quote which proves the point, from a WWII Ranger veteran friend of mine… Pfc James Gabaree, A Company 5th Battalion.




[SIZE=11pt]When briefed for the invasion, we were told that the Air Force would bomb all the German forti[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]cations, there would be minimum opposition and bomb craters on the beach would give us shelter from enemy [/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]re. I was 19 years old and was about to take part in an event that would affect the course of history ... [/SIZE]

Another quote from Ranger Oliver Reed, C Company 2nd Rangers…..

[SIZE=11pt]The beach was not cratered and there had been no bombs dropped at all – but the [/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]ghters were still stra[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]ng around us. There was another pillbox on the cliff into which wounded were throwing grenades. Snipers were thick on the beach and the men took cover behind the rocks. Where we landed there were no obstacles and if I had landed in shallower water, I could have made it. [/SIZE]







[SIZE=11pt]Yet[/SIZE]…[SIZE=11pt]. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory's report on D-day reads:-[/SIZE]






[SIZE=11pt]From H-30 to H-5 minutes heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force would strike enemy beach defenses in the assault area between the Vire and the Orne. In the V Corps’ zone 480 B-24s were to attack 13 target areas with 1,285 tons of bombs. Of these targets, 11 were between Pointe et Raz de la Percée and the eastern end of the Omaha landing one, including every strongpoint in the system of beach defenses. The loading consisted for the most part of 100-pound fragmentation and high-explosive bombs, with some 500-pound high-explosive bombs for certain strongpoints. [/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]All loads were [/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]tted with instantaneous fuzes in order to prevent cratering of the beach and consequent delay in movement of traf[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]c across it. [/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]West of Omaha, the battery positions at Pointe du Hoc would receive a [/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]nal attack by 18 medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force, delivered between H-20 and H-5 minutes. In the same period, mediums would deliver a blow of equal weight at Maisy, and the gun positions there and at Gefosse Fontenay were the targets of two squadrons of [/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]ghter-bombers.[/SIZE]


[SIZE=11pt]The signi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]fi[/SIZE][SIZE=11pt]cance of the paragraph highlighted in bold is obvious. Contrary to the opinion of virtually ALL the troops on the ground and every historian to date, bombing of the beaches may well have taken place, but not for the reasons they assume. All the Rangers I have interviewed have commented on the lack of craters for shelter on the beach. It would appear from the statement above that the RAF was using specially selected ordnance to do completely the opposite. Was this simply a mistake in expectation between the two sections of the Allied troops – the army were expecting craters and the air force were trying to destroy wire and emplacements and not make craters? It’s an interesting thought, and another alternative is that perhaps the two parties never actually discussed it. [/SIZE]








[SIZE=11pt]The British War Cabinet were given a ‘Summary of Operations of Bomber Command for Four Weeks ending 18th June 1944’ which states: [/SIZE]
[SIZE=11pt]Results of Operations [/SIZE]
[SIZE=11pt]The great bulk of operations carried out during this period were designed to assist either directly or indirectly the establishment and maintenance of our forces ashore in Normandy and the reduction and hampering of the enemy force opposed to them. [/SIZE]
[SIZE=11pt]Gun Positions and Coastal Batteries in France. [/SIZE]
[SIZE=11pt]Bomber Command took a highly successful part in the attack of gun positions and coastal batteries in France during the period. Very good results were obtained on Beaumont, Trouville, Eu, Le Clipon, Neufchatel and St. Vallery-en-Caux. On the eve of D-Day attacks were carried out by 1,136 aircraft on 10 coastal batteries to such good effect that, with the sole exception of the battery at Maisy, not a single battery was able to offer any serious resistance to the invading forces. [/SIZE]

And finally… Flak Battalion No 1 was sent to defend Maisy from the 5th of June onwards (bad timing for them)… and they did have a number of 88mm guns. The problem was that from the elevated position at Maisy, they could not depress their barrels enough to engage targets on the beach. There is a full account of their problems - written by their commanding officer Major Werner von Kistowski, who wrote to author Cornelius Ryan in 1953.

I hope this has been of some help.

 

I suspect that for the infantryman, understandably, no amount of prep fire ever seems like enough. Even if a lot of the enemy defenses are knocked out, if some are still shooting, that's too many!

 

Well the preliminary bombardment was significantly lighter than the Marine experiance indicated was useful. In this case the USA wasn't for some reason willing to listen to the USMC.

 

One big difference from the Pacific, when the fleet arrived at some Japanese-held island, the defenders were cut off from reinforcement. We could bombard for several days and there wasn't anything the Japanese could do to make the landing any more difficult. In Europe the pre-invasion bombardment was also the cue for the Germans to start moving panzers and other reinforcements towards the beachhead - or at least the Allied planners had to assume it would be; they couldn't count on the enemy reaction being held up until the Fuhrer woke up!

 

Allied intelligence had not located or identified the position of the 352 Infantry Division and none of its 12 batteries, in field positions were on the allied fireplan.

The fireplan worked at Omaha Beach in that the operation succeeded with acceptable casualties. . An Operations research study calculated that the 103 machine gun equivalents on Omaha beach inflicted an 29 casualties, substantially less than might have been expected from weapons engaging an enemy without return fire.
.
http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/55465-comparison-of-british-and-american-areas-in-normandy-in-terms-of-fire-support-and-effect/

 

Sorry this is not correct …. I have the intelligence reports and pre-day evaluations. The 352nd are clearly marked as being in the area for some weeks. VERY CLEARLY marked - so this is another D-day myth that has perpetuated.

They knew full well which unit they were facing… or at least the planners and the overall command did because it is in the intelligence packs. Which creates a very interesting second discussion about them letting the men go in despite it.

The coastal batteries are all very clearly marked, but as you say the mobile batteries behind Omaha were harder to locate. That said - air spotting located most if not all on the 6th of June - then the navy cleared them.