Prince of Wales and Repulse are sent to the DEI

At that stage of the war, December 1941, the Allies hadn't quite gotten their act together as far as covering their ship movements. They were in something of a panic, and still thought of the Japanese as subpar compared to themselves (regardless of Pearl Harbor). They (especially Churchill) thought they could just throw a couple of capital ships in there, and win the day.

That's the main issue: Churchill not accepting that WWII was an airpower war. He was a member of the gun club. And I think sending the PoW and Repulse to the DEI would have been conditional upon the British retaining control.

I think the Japanese would have known the two British ships would have been in the neighborhood, and intensified aerial reconnaissance.

Same result, different waters.

 

Keep in mind that the Allied fuel situation throughout that entire campaign was always rather precarious. For example one snapshot in time comes from page #36 of USN Combat Narrative: The Java Sea Campaign

"The tanker Pecos was held till the 25th in an attempt to remove some of the oil from Tjilatjap, but the Dutch could not bring themselves to believe that Java could be lost and consequently were unwilling to remove oil from either Soerabaja or Tjilatjap until it was too late. The fuel situation was becoming actute. The Erling Brovig, under charter to our Navy, had been sent to Ceylon for fuel, and the Trinity had sailed for Persia on the same errand. The George D. Henry had been filled at Darwin and was waiting at Fremantle for orders."

Had the PoW and Repulse (and their escorts) been delpoyed instead to the DEIs, how would they all have been kept fueled ?

In addition page #31 of HyperWar: USSBS: Campaigns of the Pacific War provides the following description of the heavy naval support forces maintained in the area by the IJN, forces that surely would have been turned loose on "Force Z" had it shifted eastwards to the DEIs rather than basing out of Singapore.

"Employment of Japanese Carriers and Battleships

An important feature of the Philippine and Indies-Malaya Campaign was the Japanese employment of battleships, cruisers and large carriers as support forces. Although these ships did not take part in the amphibious operations and indeed participated in only minor surface action, they were always lying off ready to render assistance if necessary. The movements of the Main Body of the Second Fleet together with that of the Carrier Striking Force are shown in Appendix 11. That these ships could participate in such widespread operations perfectly coordinated with the activities of the invasion forces in only another indication of the careful planning and preparation made by the Japanese prior to the war. At the commencement of hostilities, the Main Body of the Second Fleet, which contained the only two battleships during the Southern Operations, moved south towards Singapore to intercept the Prince of Wales and Repulse should the 22d Air Flotilla fail in its attack. From Camranh Bay it moved from operation to operation: after supporting the Lingayen invasion, it proceeded to Palau where it rendezvoused with the Pearl Harbor Striking Force and moved south to the Kendari area to support he Netherlands East Indies Campaign. Except for the carrier attacks on Ambon on 23 January and on Darwin 19 February, this powerful force of four battleships, six large aircraft carriers and several cruisers and destroyers took part in no further action until it arrived in the Indian Ocean on 25 February 1942. Here it operated in support of the Java and Christmas Island invasions and intercepted Allied ships attempting to escape from the Java Sea. Upon completion of the Java operations the force returned to Staring Bay, Celebes, where it refueled and reorganized for the strikes on Colombo and Trincomalee carried out on 5 and 9 April. These strikes were successful and on 18 April 1942, the day of the B-25 raid on Tokyo, the Striking Force arrived back in home waters. Thus, between 7 December 1941 and 9 April 1942, the Japanese Carrier Striking Force operated across 120° of longitude from Hawaii to Ceylon and conducted strikes against ships and shore installations at Pearl Harbor, Rabaul, Ambon, Darwin, Tjilatjap, Colombo, and Trincomalee. Allied losses to Japanese carrier air attack included five battleships, one aircraft tender, one cruiser and seven destroyers sunk or very heavily damaged; three battleships, three cruisers and one destroyer damaged; and thousands of tons of auxiliaries and merchant ships sunk. In addition, hundreds of Allied aircraft as well as docks, hangars and base facilities were destroyed. Despite the scope of the operations not one ship of the Japanese Carrier Striking Force was sunk or damaged by Allied action. Indeed the force was seldom sighted and never effectively attacked."

 

You forget that Churchill made the decision to send Force Z to Singapore BEFORE the outbreak of the Pacific War. Force Z was intended to have the carrier Indomitable attached, but an accidental grounding precluded that possibility. Force Z was intended as a deterrent to war, but it was far too little and way too late. It was never intended to have Force Z "win the day" in actual combat against the IJN, but simply as a token of future British involvement in the Pacific War.

Probably true, but as I've pointed out, Force Z was supposed to have air cover, but it probably wouldn't have been adequate to keep the PoW and Repulse safe from Japanese air attack. If Force Z had been sent to the NEI it would most likely have been part of the ABDA Command under British General Sir Archibald Wavell (who held the distinction of being the most frequently fired senior officer in the British Army).

If by "in the neighborhood", you mean "in the theater of operations", you are probably correct. But that's a long way from being able to predict their day-by-day positions, and thereby affording any tactical advantage to an opposing Japanese fleet.

 

Recall what the RN had for naval aviation, and even if the Indomitable had been there, she would have found her way to bottom as well. She had no Martlets, but Fulmars instead. Negligible air cover at best.

The Japanese were able to track the PoW and Repulse on their voyage north, and knew where they were, close enough to send out attacks. I see no reason they would not have been tracked in their voyage through DEI.

 

Yes, but remember that the Java Sea is a much smaller pond than the South China Sea, and surrounded on all sides with islands, and places for the Japanese to base flying boats or float planes.

By Feb 3rd, the Japanese has G4M's at Kendari, well before the Java Sea battles, and they could have been patrolling all over the Java Sea if the Japanese had an idea Force Z was around.

 

Something strange here, what about Eagle, Dorsetshire and Cornwall ?

Putting PoW and Repulse in ABDA would probably just have delayed their end for a few weeks, but with Phillips as senior commander ABDA may have achieved something more than it did.

Adding Indomitable .... IMO Fulmars would be enough against the C5M or H6K spotters/shadowers and the Japanese spotting around Java was not rally good even without giving ABDA the capability to shoot down spotters. AFAIK the 22 air flottilla had just 25 A6M and 11 short legged A5M, the Zeros could probably brush aside a squadron worth of Fulmars but there were not enough of them to escort all the bombers so that would have limited their effectiveness, a CAP of a couple of Fulmars can be a big obstacle for an unescorted raid.

If the Japanese carriers have to go after PoW and Repulse there will probably be no Darwin or Indian Ocean raid, the Jap ships were not indistructible, historically Kaga missed Indian Ocean because of engine trouble.

 

Unless the snoopers were G4M's based out of Kendari. The Fulmars couldn't have caught them.

It was one thing for the ABDA to sneak in with a few cruisers and destroyers, but adding Force Z would have just made things easier to find.