Germans bypass Stalingrad

Hi, could the Germans bypassed Stalingrad and headed for the caspian sea and cut off all the Russian forces left in the south and then take the oilfields?. I allways wondered if Hitler had not made Stalingrad a trophy because it had Stalins name on it and was it such a major target, it seems to me all it gained was to draw every German and Russian unit in the area for a street fight, one which the German army was not trained to fight.

 

If the goal was to stop the river traffic on the Volga, that was accomplished when the Germans reached it North of Stalingrad and correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that was the original intent. Leaving the Russians in possession of Stalingrad would be a danger to the push towards the oilfields. It was dangerous leaving a Russian bridgehead that close to Rostov. My two cents

 

I think the Germans made a big mistake when they divided their troops to attack both Stalingrad and Caucasus. They simply did not have the man power and tanks and planes to do that.

 

I agree with Kai.

 

I think the whole offensive into the South of Russia was a mistake. The Germans should have concentrated on areas around Moscow (not necessarily Moscow itself) with the intent of demolition of infrastructure that would hurt the Russian war effort. The conquest of Gorki, for example, would have virtually ended Soviet indigineous truck production along with a good portion of their light tank manufacturing. Taking cities that had large hydro-electric plants in that region and rendering them unusable to the Soviets would have crippled production in the whole region.
Better, the Germans would not have been nearly so hard pressed logistically to mount such a campaign. AGS was in poor shape and the territory to cover so vast in the South that logistics were a major problem right from the start.

 

It would seem to me that any troops bypassing Stalingrad would only be cut off and destoyed that much sooner.

 

Moscow area might have been a good idea but I have understood that Stalin actually kept his main reserves in that area because he believed that the Germans would throw their main offensive there. Just before the German´s northern pincer turned towards Stalingrad Stalin believed the pincer would turn towards Moscow. So they would definitely face the tough opposition faster than in the AGS area.

 

At this point I believe the Russians learned from their mistakes and began to fight like the Germans by drawing them into traps. Granted, Stalin expected the Germans to go for Moscow but responded with a well set trap.

 

That are my thoughts too! First to eliminate the infrastructure, military industry and the most important let the others see how good you treated the people in that country. The rest would have been easy!

 

They needed to establish a firm flank along the Don and Volga against the virtually inevitable Russian counterattack in the direction of Rostov, but that line did not have to include the city. It had to cover the "land bridge" between the rivers, within which Stalingrad was located, but the line could have based on the bend in the Volga south of the city, about where the Volga-Don canal is today. Alternatively they could advance past Stalingrad and base the line on the bend of the Don. That might have been a good strategy since it would give them room to maneuver, but they would have the city on their right, which could useful if they were able to take it quickly or could be a threat.

It's often suggested that 4th Panzer Army could have taken Stalingrad relatively easily if it had not been diverted south to "help" 1st Panzer Army. I don't know how true that is - anyone? - but the priority should have been to establish the line along the rivers. If that line can be held, backed up by mobile reserves, the Caucasus will eventually be taken. Without the river line, the thrust into the Caucasus is doomed; indeed the further they advance the more likely they are to be cut off when the Russians attack.

 

splitting up the army as Kai said was a big mistake and then they didnot have the strength to do both Stalingard and the push to get the oilfields.

also a good point was made on the whole campaign being a mistake which does make you think if they had not done Case Blau then the war would of turned out a little different.
still by 1943 the russian army had learned a lot of making war and modern tactics so the time was changing for Germany's Innitiative and I feel they would of lost the war anyways but it
would of gone on longer than it did.

 

Yes your right Carronade about the 4th Panzer being diverted to assist the 1st Panzer army, on the History channel on cable 1st Panzer army commander said all the 4th did was get in the way of his advance and he did not need them. if the 1st Panzer army could have isolated the Caucasus, I wonder if they could have left it to the 17th army to cross from Crimea and to other units like there own Mountain troops plus, Italain. Romanian and Hungarian forces. That would have given the germans a secure right flank (with the Black sea and the Caspian sea acting like a wall), I wonder what effect this would have on the Turkish side of things ?, would they of stayed neutral or tried to get on the bandwagon and helped the Axis in this area.

 

For the 6th army to bypass Stalingrad and going south to the Caucasus would not be clever:there are a lot of km from Stalingrad to the oilfields .The shortest way was the way of AGA,and .it failed .
H.Magenheimer argued in "Hitler's War" that Fall Blau only could succeed if,IMMEDIATELY after the launching of the offensive,the Germans could destroy large parts of the Russian army (capture some 700000POW) and prevent the Russian withdrawal to the Wolga and the Caucasus .
If the Germans failed to encircle and destroy the bulk of the Soviet Southern and South-western Fronts ,as well as parts of the opposing Bryansk Front at the very beginning of the attack,there was hardly any hope of their taking Stalingrad and the valuable areas of the Caucasus before the onset of the winter .(Hitler's War P139 and 140)
IMHO(not Magenheimer's),the situation was the same as in june 1941:in both cases,the only chance for the Germans to succeed,was,if they immediately could destroy the opposing Russian forces .And,in both cases,they failed .
Also IMHO,in august 1942,Fall Blau had failed ,and the only alternative was to withdraw to the startline of Fall Blau,but,there were a lot of points that prevented this .

 

Well, considering:
"To summarize developments, Hitler had sent the strongest force available towards an objective that would not necessarily win the war. That force could not be logistically supported and advanced into an ever-expanding space against an opponent that was gaining, not losing strength. He had sent his most powerful army into Stalingrad where it basically destroyed its combat power in costly attacks that played into the enemy’s hands. And finally, even though intelligence indicated the probability of a major Soviet counter offensive, the German military leadership resorted to merely cosmetic measures"

And:

"Nevertheless, perhaps the most important revelation of Stalingrad was how city fighting impinged upon the strategic level of warfare. Regardless of the lack of wisdom behind advancing into southern Russia in 1942, Stalingrad played only a peripheral role in that offensive. Through the course of the campaign, however, possession of the city somehow came to dominate Hitler’s thinking.
Somehow, a city of relatively minor significance had become a crucial factor in national decision-making."

Both quotes from S.J. Lewis- Urban Operations - An Historical Casebook

I would say that it was imperative that Army Group South remained singular in focus and maintain its force integrity (don't split it up, dissipate its combat power while complicating logistical support) at the very least. I would agree with TA's suggestion of a Moscow area operation, perhaps even using AGS from its northern most positions to invest Moscow from the south and even attempting an envelopment from the East of the city to avoid the defense in depth that the Soviets had built on the western approaches. That approach would draw Soviet reserves into a mobile fight in the open which in Summer of 1942 heavily favored the Germans.

 

Also I recall Hitler sent troops from South ( Crimea ) to invade Leningrad at the same time as going for Stalingrad, but the Soviet counter-offensive exhausted these troops and also prevented the German operation, then again the German reserves were useful in stopping the Red Army´s attack.

 

Was not the German Reinforcements from the Crimea sent to Leningrad rather meager, and largely the seige artillery used to level Svestapol?

 

Could the Axis have crossed the Volga at another point and rushed mobile forces around Stalingrad, I allways thougth that if the Russian troops at Stalingrad were being supplied by boats crossing the Volga, maybe an assault to cut this life line off, I know that the airforce and artillery tried to bomb the river but they kept on getting across, if they could have crossed the river and encircled the city similar to what the Russains did to the Axis, they could have trapped them in there own Kessel.

 

Yes, don´t have exact figures but it was the 11th Army or rather some parts of it...

"In late July, 11th Army was ordered northwards to join the Army Group North andin August of 1942, von Manstein was once again in charge of forces attacking the city of Leningrad."

Achtung Panzer! - Erich von Manstein!

 

And,lucky for the Germans the 11th Army was there ,otherwise,Leningrad would be a catastrophe.

 

Remember anyone the fairytale of Leon Tolstoi 'How much land a man needs', mentioned in a very correct point in Beevor's book, 'Stalingrad'?